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***THEORY OF UNDERSTANDING IN THE EARLY HEIDEGGER:
TRANSCENDENTAL-PHENOMENOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE***

Dissertation summary

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GENERAL DESCRIPTION

The Relevance of the Study

The publication of Heidegger's Collected Edition (Gesamtausgabe, GA), the process of which was launched in 1976, while the philosopher was still alive, continues to this day. The sequence of the publications posted on the Vittorio Klostermann website was determined by Heidegger himself¹, who bequeathed to follow a *chronological* principle in this endeavour. The plan was to close the series with Volume 102, due out in 2022. Nevertheless, some of Heidegger's writings have not yet been published and are forthcoming in the coming years. The study of Heidegger's *Gesamtausgabe* is thus an actual process, which Heidegger intended to develop into a work on the "Legacy of the Being Question" (Vermächtnis der Seinsfrage) in the long run.

Moreover, the adherence to the chronological principle bequeathed by Heidegger was to determine not only the order of publication of works from the legacy that revealed the being-question, but also the very research principles that were to turn the investigation of the published *Gesamtausgabe* into the *philosophical problem*. In particular, among such approaches and principles to the study of the philosopher's legacy is the investigation of Heidegger "*from the beginning*". This approach implies an appeal to the initial problematics of Heidegger's phenomenological-ontological doctrine as a factor that determined the development of his entire philosophical thought. This approach not only presupposes in advance the unity and continuity of the question of being, but also considers the question of being, including its initial statement, as the "Zero point" of Heidegger's philosophy, the return to which he makes whenever his philosophical thought moves to a new round of development.

¹ Heidegger approved the first and second versions of the plan: Kisiel, Theodore (1993) «Heidegger's Gesamtausgabe as a Philosophical Problem: Prolegomena», Heidegger Circle Proceedings, Vol. 27, pp. 11–169;
Kisiel, Theodore (1995) «Heidegger's Gesamtausgabe: An International Scandal of Scholarship, Philosophy Today, 39 (1), pp. 3–15.

Most notable in this respect is still Heidegger's project of a fundamental ontology, as presented in the treatise *Being Time*. It must be said that this philosophical work, despite being immediately recognised as Heidegger's magnum opus, is revealed in the perspective of Heidegger's Collected Edition as only a special case in the series of his attempts to develop basic ontological concepts. Moreover, according to Heidegger's self-interpretation, the fundamental ontology of *Being and Time* is a failed project. However, the reconstruction of the philosophical problematics, including the phenomenological project of the early Heidegger, which is the source of the treatise, allows us to look at this period of Heidegger's philosophical work in a new way, since not only the content and the ideas of the treatise, but mainly the "path" Heidegger made toward *Being and Time* becomes significant.

At the same time, it is worth noting that the gap in the publication of works from the period between 1915 and 1927, i.e. before the publication of *Being and Time*, has been eliminated relatively recently². For a long time the treatise gave rather a false impression of some closed, overcomplicated and already completed system of concepts, the work with which caused difficulties not only for its readers, but also for researchers. Only with the elimination of this gap did it become clear that the treatise demonstrates the results of previous scrupulous work with philosophical concepts, and also refers to a certain range of problems on which Heidegger had had the opportunity to work for quite some time.

The initiated process of publishing the *Gesamtausgabe* thus created the necessary conditions to make it possible to examine in its dynamics the very *process* of Heidegger's philosophical development. In addition, the publication of Heidegger's early writings has made it possible to set new and significant

² Kisiel, Theodore (1995a) «The Genesis of Heidegger's «Being and Time», University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, pp. 1—2.

connections of his ideas and intertextual connections. This means that the reconstruction of the original problematics of Heidegger's philosophy can now be carried out not only on the basis of Heidegger's own writings, but also on the basis of the sources that conditioned his philosophical development. For example, the commentary literature has long noted the general "neo-Kantian background" of the writings included in the first volume of the Collected Edition. A somewhat later discovery, however, was the conceptual connection between Heidegger's work and the writings of the neo-Kantian Lask, which held a special significance for Heidegger. This is evidenced by the fact that some of the philosophical tools found in *Being and Time* still derive from the philosophical terminology developed in Lask's *Logic of Philosophy*. Nevertheless, for the moment, the significance of this conceptual adaptation remains not entirely clear.

In addition, the commentary literature usually assumes connections between *Logical Investigations* and *Being and Time*. After all, the fundamental importance of Husserl's work for his development is often noted by Heidegger himself. However, Heidegger refers precisely to the *Sixth Logical Investigation*, which becomes the main subject of his interest at the time of his "phenomenological decade". Heidegger's 1925 lecture course "Prolegomena to the History of the Concept of Time" testifies to this in particular. The content of this course, on the one hand, can be characterised as a kind of exegesis of the *Sixth Logical Investigation*, in which the key concepts of this book are interpreted, mainly the ideas of intentionality, the new meaning of the a priori and categorial intuition³. At the same time, the notes of this course also become the first draft for *Being and Time*, in which these concepts are already absent. The reason for this lies in the fact that Heidegger, in his endeavour to develop in *Being and Time* the basic intuitions of Husserl's *Logical Investigations*, also

³ Heidegger M. GA20. *Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1979. S. 34.

carries out a transformation of all the basic phenomenological concepts. Therefore, one of the main difficulties that can be encountered when analysing the text of *Being and Time* is the question: how exactly does Heidegger adapt the concept mentioned above within the framework of his own project of fundamental ontology?

Of course, to give an exhaustive and unambiguous answer to this question is a virtually impossible task. Like Heidegger's *Being and Time*, the sixth book of *Logical Investigations* remains perhaps one of the darkest texts in the history of philosophy. Nevertheless, raising this question is crucial for clarifying the very origins of Heidegger's philosophical problematics, since without appropriate reconstructions it is hardly possible to shed light on the development of Heidegger's question of being within the framework of his philosophical works.

Thus, it should be summarised: the relevance of this paper is ensured by the fact that the investigation of Heidegger's philosophical legacy, which is definitely not exhausted by the investigation of the works included in the Collected Edition, cannot be considered complete at the moment. It was stated earlier that Heidegger's philosophical development is described as a history of attempts to form ontological concepts, including a particular context and original set of questions behind the formation of the 'being-question'. A return to the very original problematics of his philosophy has been proposed as a productive strategy in the investigation of Heidegger's legacy. It is this approach that is largely consistent with Heidegger's reflection, according to which the development of the being-question is not a matter of evolution, but of a series of philosophical projects, each of which is marked by a characteristic return to the starting point of his philosophy.

The present dissertation proposes to return to the phenomenological formulation of the question in the early Heidegger and to reconstruct the transcendental-phenomenological origin and foundation of his philosophising. The present study therefore turns to the problem of categories, which, as will be shown in the three chapters of the dissertation, constitutes a central element of the problematics of the early Heidegger's writings. The subject of the study will thus be a specific "theory of categories", the features of which are outlined in Heidegger's works. However, since already in Heidegger's earliest works the "question of categories" and the "doctrine of meaning" are not confined within the framework of purely logical problems, but rather they are revealed within the framework of the transcendental-phenomenological formulation of the question of being, the subject of the study would more properly be called a "theory of understanding".

In addition, the range of questions of this study implies, as it has already been noted, an appeal not only to the works of Heidegger himself, but also to the works of other authors, on which Heidegger is orientated in the development of the problem of categories. These are mainly Husserl's *Logical Investigations*, Lask's *The Logic of Philosophy and the Doctrine of Categories*, and Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. Therefore, the key ideas of these works, as well as the way they are explained in the works of the early Heidegger, will be considered in this study as a theoretical foundation of the "being-question". This perspective will allow us to set some of the key conceptual connections for the formation of the project of fundamental ontology, to trace the transformations of this problematic in the writings of the early Heidegger, and to fix several important points for it, the last of which will be the closure of the project of fundamental ontology, associated with Heidegger's transition to the post transcendental formulation of the question of being.

The Extent of Prior Investigation of the Topic

The above-mentioned analysis of the genesis of the concepts of fundamental ontology has been outlined in the research literature for a long time. Among the most important studies in this direction are the works of T. Kisiel. First of all, we should mention his fundamental work "*The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time*"⁴. In this work, the author endeavours to establish, as far as possible, the full range of Heidegger's early thought. In fact, this work by Kisiel is one of the first and most complete and reliable histories of Heidegger's development, covering the period 1915-1927. However, it is also worth mentioning numerous other works by T. Kisiel that develop more narrowly defined themes of the philosophy of early Heidegger, among which the most important for this dissertation are: *Towards Being and Time: An Introduction to the Translation of Heidegger's Prolegomenon to the History of the Concept of Time, Heidegger (1907-1927): The Transformation of the Categorical*⁵, *Why Students of Heidegger Will Have to Read Emil Lask*⁶, and others. A study of *the early Heidegger* by J. Van Buren⁷ has been carried out in the same vein. Moreover, the very first attempt to deal with the philosophy of *the early Heidegger*, which was in agreement with Heidegger himself, can be regarded as O. Pöggeler's *Martin Heidegger's Path of Thinking*⁸, first published in 1963.

⁴ Kisiel, Theodore (1995) «*The Genesis of Heidegger's «Being and Time»*», University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London.

⁵ Kisiel T. Heidegger (1907-1927): *The Transformation of the Categorical* //Heidegger Circle Proceedings. — 1975. — Vol. 9. — P. 109-134.

⁶ Kisiel, Theodore (1995b) «*Why Students of Heidegger Will Have to Read Emil Lask*», *Man and World*, Vol. 28 (3), pp. 197—240

⁷ Buren, J. Van. *The young Heidegger: Rumor of the hidden king*. — Indiana University Press, 1994.

⁸ Pöggeler, Otto. *Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers*. Pfullingen: Neske, 1990.

In Russian, the study of the genesis of *Being and Time* was outlined in I. Mikhailov's monograph *The Early Heidegger: Between Phenomenology and Philosophy of Life*⁹, which aims to systematically trace the development of Heidegger's philosophy (1910-1925). Also A. Chernyakov's monograph *The Ontology of Time. Being and Time in the Philosophy of Aristotle, Husserl and Heidegger* is devoted to the more general task of studying the fundamental concepts of post-classical metaphysics (phenomenology). The idea of temporality is considered here as the very principle of formation of phenomenological concepts, and the genealogy of subjectivity becomes the central theme, from which the author turns to the key question of the study – to the question of the "heir" of transcendental subjectivity. The posing of this question, in its turn, is fully discussed through Heidegger's "transition" from categories to existentials, which, as the author notes, is problematic in nature and requires further research.

The key ideas of Heidegger's theory of being as the theory of understanding, in turn, are explored in the works of A.B. Patkul, in particular in his monograph *The Idea of Philosophy as Science of Being in Heidegger's Fundamental Ontology*.

Moreover, among the studies discussing the transcendental-phenomenological foundations of the early Heidegger's philosophy we can distinguish, besides the already mentioned works of T. Kisiel, the works of S. G. Crowell, T. Sheehan, I. Feher, D. Dahlstrom and others. These works became particularly important for the development of the first chapter of the present dissertation, which is devoted to the original problematics of Heidegger's phenomenological philosophy and its possible connections with the neo-Kantian tradition. For example, the connection

⁹ Mikhailov I. A. (in Russian): *The Early Heidegger: Between Phenomenology and Philosophy of Life*. Moscow: Progress–Tradition, 1991. 284 p.

between the writings of the neo-Kantian Lask – including conceptual connections – and the writings of the early Heidegger has been thoroughly analysed in the works of I. Feher, T. Kisiel and S. G. Crowell. The first chapter is largely based on a series of articles by S. G. Crowell: *Lask, Heidegger, and the Homelessness of the Logic*¹⁰, *Emil Lask: Aletheology as Ontology*¹¹, *Husserl, Lask and the Idea of Transcendental Logic*¹²; on the above-mentioned article by T. Kisiel and I. Fehér's article *Lask, Lukács, Heidegger: the Problem of Irrationality and the Theory of Categories*. These studies not only provide historical and philosophical analyses of the works of Lask, Husserl and Heidegger, but also reconstruct the "theory of categories" whose principles are formed in their works. In addition, the influence of the neo-Kantian tradition on Heidegger is discussed in the works of S. Luft, M. Friedman and E. Kurawski¹³. In Russian, the influence of E. Lask on the early Heidegger is discussed in an article by L. Kornilaev¹⁴. Also important for the development of the first chapter was the collection of articles *Heidegger and Logic*¹⁵, edited by A. Denker, which contains studies on logical problems in the early Heidegger's philosophy in general, by such authors as P. Travný, A. Denker, K. Kisiel, E. Nelson and others.

The second chapter of this dissertation reconstructs the specificity of the phenomenological theory of meaning by turning to Husserl's *Logical*

¹⁰ Crowell, Steven G. (1992) *Lask, Heidegger, and the Homelessness of Logic*, Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, Vol. 23 (3), P. 222—239.

¹¹ Crowell, Steven G. (2001) *Emil Lask: Aletheiology as Ontology*, Northwestern University Press, Evanston (IL), P. 37—56.

¹² Crowell, Steven G. (2001) *Husserl, Lask, and the Idea of Transcendental Logic*, Northwestern University Press, Evanston (IL), P. 56—76.

¹³ Kuravsky, Erik. *The Early Neo-Kantian Origins and the Problem of Encounter. Transcendence in Heidegger's Early Thought: Toward Being as Event*. Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland, 2023. 3-26.

¹⁴ Kornilaev L.Yu. (in Russian) *Influence of E. Lask's Logic of Philosophy on the Early M. Heidegger* // Russian Journal of Philosophical Sciences, 2016. № (12). P. 73-82.

¹⁵ Denker, Alfred, and Holger Zaborowski, eds. *Heidegger und die Logik*. Vol. 79. Rodopi, 2006.

Investigations, to the interpretation of the key ideas of this work in the writings of the early Heidegger, partly by Lask, and to the interpretive literature devoted to the analysis of phenomenological philosophy. However, when it comes to comparative analyses of Husserl's and Heidegger's phenomenology in its entirety, it should be noted that a vast literature is devoted to it. Therefore, the range of authors on whose research the present chapter is based is very limited by the very problematic, which implies explication of the conceptual and substantive connections between the concept of categorial intuition in the *Sixth Logical Investigation* and the notion of the being, developed by Heidegger.

Thus, in reconstructing the phenomenological concept of categorial intuition, the present chapter refers mainly to those authors who, in their studies, discuss the phenomenological theory of meaning and analyse the basic concepts of the *Sixth Logical Investigation*, among whom the following names can be distinguished: R. Sokolowski, R. Cobb-Stevens, R. Burnett, D. Lohmar and others. In explaining the phenomenological concept of truth in *Sixth Logical Investigation* and its connection with the concept of truth in Heidegger's fundamental ontology, this study is largely based on the works of E. Tugendhat, D. Dahlstrom, E. Ströcker and others.

In Russian, critical analyses of Husserl's and Heidegger's phenomenology in his works are carried out by V. Molchanov¹⁶. V. Molchanov also prepared a translation of *Logical Investigations* and a commentary on them. Thus, the translation of Prolegomena and the first five investigations was prepared by V. Molchanov in 2011. The translation of the first two chapters of *Sixth Logical Investigation*, in turn, was published in the *Yearbook of Phenomenological Philosophy*¹⁷ in 2021. In 2024, the full translation of the VI *Logical*

¹⁶ Molchanov V. I. (in Russian) *Studies on the phenomenology of consciousness*. Moscow: Publishing House "Territory of the Future", 2007.

¹⁷ Husserl E. (in Russian) *Logical Investigations*. Vol. II, Part II (*Sixth Logical Investigation*): Elements of the phenomenological elucidation of cognition. Chapters. 1-2 / trans. from

Investigation became available to the Russian-speaking reader, which for a long time remained available only as the XIX/1 volume of *Husserliana* (Hua).

In addition, some of the articles by V. Kurennoy and I. Inishev are devoted to the study of the early phenomenology of Husserl and Heidegger. The study of "the emergence of Heidegger's philosophy from Husserl's phenomenology" is the subject of an article by Ya. A. Slinin¹⁸. The approach to substantiating the conceptual unity of the phenomenology of Husserl and Heidegger is developed in the dissertation of E. Borisov. The conceptual analysis of the early phenomenological projects of Husserl and Heidegger is made in the dissertation of E. Tugendhat.

It is also worth mentioning the 2005 *Husserliana* XX/2 volume *Towards the Phenomenology of Expression and Knowledge*¹⁹, which is Husserl's supplement to the *Sixth Logical Investigation*. This volume is notable for shedding some light on the philosophical content of the sixth investigation, which remains the darkest and most theoretically opaque area of Husserl's phenomenology. This volume has also been widely discussed in the academic literature. First of all, the collection of articles published by Springer *Meaning and Language: Phenomenological Perspective*²⁰, which was prepared directly on the occasion of the publication of this volume. It presents papers discussing the specificity of the phenomenological theory of meaning by authors such as J. Benoit, U. Melle, F. Mattens and other researchers in phenomenological philosophy.

German. V.I. Molchanov // *Yearbook of Phenomenological Philosophy*. 2021. №. 1. – P. 242-299.

¹⁸ Slinin Y. A. (in Russian) *The emergence of Heidegger's philosophy from Husserl's phenomenology* // *M. Heidegger: Pro et contra*. 2020. P. 704-740.

¹⁹ *Husserl Ed.* *Logische Untersuchungen. Ergänzungsband. Zweiter Teil.* (Hua 20/2) / hrsg von U. Melle — Dordrecht: Springer, 2005.

²⁰ Mattens F. *Meaning and Language: Phenomenological Perspectives*. Springer Netherlands, 2008.

The problem of language in Husserl's phenomenology is also examined in G. Kung's article *The World as Noema and as Referent*²¹; Husserl's theory of meaning in its connection with Lask's logic of philosophy is examined in the article by K. Schuchmann, B. Smith²²; R. Bernasconi and Fr.-W. von Hermann consider the problem of language in Heidegger's fundamental ontology. Special mention should be made of the works of K. Michalski, in which one can find a special treatment of the phenomenological idea of intuition in the context of the logical problematic of meaning. In general, however, it can hardly be said that the connection between the *Sixth Logical Investigation* and the works of early Heidegger has been systematically and completely explored in the commentary literature by now.

The third chapter of the dissertation is devoted to Heidegger's interpretation of Kant's doctrine of transcendental method, and reveals the phenomenological features of such an interpretation. This chapter is based in part on some of the works of S.G. Crowell²³, who, after Heidegger's so-called "phenomenological decade", introduces and justifies the idea of his "metaphysical decade". S. G. Crowell, however, critically analyses the methodological transformations of the "early middle Heidegger" and associates the "collapse" of the project of fundamental ontology with Heidegger's transition to the grounding of metaphysics. The present chapter, while capturing this transition, sees rather a continuity between Heidegger's transcendental-philosophical grounding of the question of being, the theory of

²¹ Kung G. *The World as Noema and as Referent* // Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology. — 1972. Vol. 3, no. 1. — P. 15—26.

²² Schuchmann K., Smith B. *Two Idealismus: Lask and Husserl* // Kant Studien. — 1993. Vol. 84, no. 4. — P. 448—66.

²³ Crowell S. G. *Metaphysics, metontology, and the End of Being and Time* // Philosophical and Phenomenological Research. — 2000. — P. 307-331; Crowell S. G. *The Middle Heidegger's Phenomenological Metaphysics* // The Oxford Handbook of the History of Phenomenology. — 2018. — P. 229-25.

factual understanding outlined in *Being and Time*, and the grounding of a "metaphysics of Dasein".

Heidegger's new interpretation of Kant's doctrine, in turn, is devoted to significant sections in the works of P. Gaidenko²⁴, as well as in the dissertation of N. Artemenko²⁵. M. Friedman's work²⁶ highlights Heidegger's polemics with neo-Kantianism, including the example of the Davos discussion with Cassirer, the subject of which the author connects with the withdrawal of neo-Kantianism from the scene of world philosophy, on the one hand, and with the growing interest in a new "existential interpretation" of Kant, on the other. The translation and commentary of the book "Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics" was prepared by O. Nikiforov. The transcendental character of Heidegger's philosophy is studied in the works of S. I. Stavtsev. The influence of German idealism on the development of phenomenology was studied in the work of A. Schnell²⁷. Heidegger's interpretation of Kant, including the problem of categories, is also studied in the works of M. Weatherstone, W. Blattner, K. Lafont and others.

It should thus be noted that Heidegger's being-question, the development of which, up to a certain period, takes place within the transcendental philosophical tradition, has its own boundaries: the development of the being-question in the transcendental way can be traced directly up to the Heidegger's turn to the idea of Kant's grounding of metaphysics. In exploring these boundaries, the final chapter draws in particular on the testimony of

²⁴ Gaidenko P. P. (in Russian) *Breakthrough to the Transcendent*. New Ontology of the XXth Century. - Moscow: Respublika, 1997.

²⁵ Artemenko N. A. (in Russian) *The significance of temporal analysis for the foundation of transcendentalism in M. Heidegger*, Abstract of the Doctoral Thesis for the Degree of Candidate of Philosophical Sciences. Saint Petersburg, 2005.

²⁶ Friedman, M. (in Russian) *Philosophy at the Crossroads: Carnap, Cassirer and Heidegger*. Translated from English by V. V. Tselishev. Moscow: Kanon+ ROOI "Rehabilitation", 2021.

²⁷ Schnell A. *Phenomenology and German Idealism* //The Oxford Handbook of the History of Phenomenology. — 2018. — P. 68-87.

Heidegger himself, who, while working on *Being and Time*, saw the further development of fundamental ontology precisely in the direction of a fundamental-ontological interpretation of *Critique of Pure Reason*. This is confirmed by the fact that, according to Heidegger's original plans, the book *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* was to be included as one of its sections in the second – ultimately unpublished – part of *Being and Time*. Along with this, it is in Heidegger's interpretation of the *Critique of Pure Reason* that the limits of his fundamental ontology as the project of transcendental philosophy, which at the same time represent the limits of fundamental ontology in its entirety, become very clear. Moreover – and no less importantly – Heidegger's transition to a new – "post-transcendental" – formulation of the question of being also emerges in this period. This transition, in turn, constitutes a subject that necessitates a dedicated investigation.

Object and Subject-matter of the Study

The present dissertation research is concerned with the works of the German philosopher Martin Heidegger (GA) from the early period of his philosophical development (from 1912 to the early 1930s.), as well as some of his later works which present his retrospective view on the formation of the "being-question". The latter include *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*, Heidegger's reflective article *My Way to Phenomenology, Seminar in Zeringen* (1973), etc. In addition, the object of the research includes Husserl's *Logical Investigations*, Lask's *The Logic of Philosophy and the Doctrine of Categories* and Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. These texts serve as the foundation for the intertextual analysis.

The **subject** of the dissertation is the transcendental-phenomenological foundations of the specific theory of understanding as *developed* in the works of

the early Heidegger. The study focuses on the problem of categories and captures the conceptual shifts corresponding to this problem, including transformations of concepts that are carried out in relation to the original philosophical terms in the works of Lask, Husserl and Kant.

The Methodological and Theoretical Framework of the Study

The study proceeds from a number of assumptions, which can be formulated as follows. Firstly, the horizon of Heidegger's investigation of the being becomes accessible exclusively within the framework of the phenomenological method. The main principles of his approach should be sought first of all in those ideas of phenomenological philosophy to which Heidegger himself refers. This study also takes into account the fact that Heidegger's adaptation of the phenomenological method to the question of being took place gradually throughout his "phenomenological decade", which in turn is preceded by the first formulation of the question of being within the framework of neo-Kantian epistemology. This leads to the assumption that, before Heidegger turned to phenomenological philosophy, the content of his thought had already been largely determined by neo-Kantian philosophy. This assumption, if confirmed, should also be taken into account in the study of Heidegger's "phenomenological decade".

Second, despite the later struggle between Heidegger and Husserl to develop an authentic concept of phenomenology, and the different conceptual structures of the two versions of phenomenology, Heidegger's fundamental ontology is in many ways a development of precisely those ideas and intuitions expressed in Husserl's *Logical Investigations*, especially in the *Sixth Logical Investigation*. However, due to the many transformations that conceptual structure of Heidegger's philosophical project underwent on the way to *Being*

and Time, many of the distinctions of fundamental ontology cannot be directly traced back to the original phenomenological or neo-Kantian concepts. Reconstructing these conceptual connections, in turn, requires a substantive and conceptual reconstruction of those philosophical ideas and questions that underlie Heidegger's question of being.

The present study thus continues the line of analysis of concepts and groups of concepts developed by Heidegger on his way to *Being and Time* that has already emerged in the research literature. In this respect, the aim of this study is to shed light on the problematic context and the genesis of the ideas and concepts analysed in this dissertation, and to align them with the "conceptual story" of Heidegger's philosophy already outlined in the research literature. For this purpose, the present study also turns to classical methods of analysis – primarily *textual* and *contextual analysis*. The first method aims at analysing the conceptual structure and the process of its formation in the works of the early Heidegger. The second is necessary to identify a common conceptual field in the texts of Heidegger, Husserl, Lask and Kant. Furthermore, the method of *historical-philosophical reconstruction* forms the methodological basis of the present study, which is used for the reconstruction of philosophical ideas that belong to the common problem field of the philosophical projects of the mentioned authors.

Study Tasks and Objective

The aim of this dissertation is to elucidate the transcendental-phenomenological foundations of the theory of understanding (the theory of categories) as developed in the writings of the early Heidegger. In addition, it seeks to identify and define the conceptual shifts that correspond to this problematic, including the transformations of concepts carried out in

relation to the original philosophical notions set forth in the writings of Lask, Husserl and Kant.

In order to attain this objective, the following tasks are essential:

1. To reconstruct Heidegger's original transcendental-phenomenological doctrine of categories and meaning using the context of Lask's *The Logic of Philosophy and the Doctrine of Categories* and Husserl's *Logical Investigations*.

2. To analyse the ways in which Heidegger adapts basic concepts from the *Logical Investigations* and *The Logic of Philosophy and the Doctrine of Categories*. To show the genetic link between some of Heidegger's conceptual innovations and the corresponding original phenomenological and neo-Kantian concepts.

Tasks (1) and (2) include:

(a) To analyse Lask's doctrine of categories as a proto-phenomenological theory of meaning and ontology of the "validity" (Geltung). In the context of this doctrine, to establish the possible meaning of the conceptual adaptation that Heidegger carries out, referring to Lask's terminology not only in his very first works, but also in such a theoretically accomplished work as *Being and Time*.

(b) To identify the specificity of signitive and intuitive intention in Husserl's analysis of perception, and to reconstruct the basic principles of the phenomenological doctrine of meaning in the works of Husserl and Heidegger.

(c) To reconstruct the idea of categorial intuition in the *Sixth Logical Investigation*, as well as the corresponding concept of truth. To establish a conceptual and contextual connection between these

ideas of Husserl's early phenomenology and some of the key ideas and concepts of Heidegger's fundamental ontology. This includes: to explain the idea of "projective understanding", i. e. understanding as "projecting" of the empty intention of meaning and its "intuitive" fulfilment in Heidegger's fundamental ontology; to demonstrate the connection of this idea with the phenomenological concept of truth as identification.

3. To identify the phenomenological grounds of Heidegger's philosophical destruction of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* as it becomes part of the project of fundamental ontology. To trace how Heidegger's interpretation of the transcendental faculty of imagination as "projective understanding" continues the development of Heidegger's earlier theory of the "understanding of the being".

4. To outline the boundaries and the connection between Heidegger's transcendental theory of understanding of the being and his idea of the "metaphysics of Dasein".

Statements to be Defended

1. The phenomenological project of ontology of the early Heidegger remains within the transcendental philosophical tradition and cannot be understood outside of the underlying transcendental-phenomenological theory of the categories and meaning, which is initially formed in the works of Kant, Lask and Husserl. Moreover, in his early works Heidegger not only implies such a connection, but in many ways claims to develop and complete the transcendental theory of the categories in his own conception of the understanding of the being.

2. Heidegger expands the conceptual apparatus of phenomenology by adapting some of the conceptual tools of Lask's logico-philosophical theory. In the earliest works – at the expense of the idea of validity (*Geltung*) and the concepts derived from it. Thus, Heidegger's first model of ontological differentiation, like Lask's, presupposes the distinction between the "entities" (*Seiende*) and the that, "what is valid" (*Geltende*). This differentiation is, in turn, carried out within the framework of the "realm of all of the conceivable", which can be interpreted as a protophenomenological idea of the horizon. At the same time, Lask's philosophical doctrine serves as a source of conceptual content not only for the very early of Heidegger's works. The conceptual connection with Lask's philosophy can be traced even in such a theoretically accomplished work as *Being and Time*: within the framework of the fundamental ontology, presented primarily in *Being and Time*, a "theory of meaning" is developed, some elements and concepts of which still derive from Lask's *Logic of Philosophy*.

3. The basic concepts of fundamental ontology go back to Husserl's *Logical Investigations*. Especially fundamental for Heidegger is the idea of the categorial intuition, which Husserl develops in the *Sixth* Logical Investigation, as well as the phenomenological concept of the truth as the identification, which is essentially connected with the idea of the categorial intuition. This conclusion is substantiated by the evidence that the phenomenological notion of possible intuitive fulfilment for empty intentions of meaning becomes an integral component of Heidegger's fundamental ontology.

Firstly, the phenomenological notion of the dynamics of empty and fulfilled intention of meaning plays a key role for the thematisation of Heidegger's notion of truth as presented in *Being and Time*. In paragraph 44 of *Being and Time*, Heidegger reproduces the logic of the grounding of the phenomenological idea of truth from Husserl's *Sixth Logical Investigation* – as

identification and as the accomplished coinciding of the meant (*Gemeintem*) and the given (*Gegebenem*) in intuition". Whereas for Husserl truth as "identifying coincidence" means that intuition gives the object exactly as it is intended in the act that meant it, for Heidegger the same relation is conceptualised in terms of a coincidence between that "*which is put forward in the assertion*" and the "*entity's showing itself*", and is sometimes formalised to the relation of "as being – just as". That unity which is established as a result of the accomplished coinciding of that, "which is put forward in the assertion" and the "entity's showing itself" is referred to by Heidegger as "uncoveredness". It can be thus concluded that the notion of truth as uncoveredness (*Entdecktheit*) is not a distinct concept within Heidegger's fundamental ontology. Rather, it reflects the phenomenological understanding of truth as the identification, or at the very least, can be traced back to this concept. Furthermore, Heidegger interprets the assertion itself, with analysis of which in *Being and Time* initiated the investigation of "Being-true" (phenomenological evidence), as "letting the entity be seen in its uncoveredness". This, in turn, indicates that the subject of the analysis here is not the assertion itself, but rather the specific acts of the realisation of assertion, namely the acts of categorial intuition.

Moreover, it can be argued that in *Being and Time*, Heidegger develops the concept of understanding as a projection, which projects the being of entities onto the "world" in its projective anticipations. The foundation of this concept becomes the phenomenological notion of possible intuitive fulfilment for empty intentions of meaning mentioned above. As an analogue to Heidegger's Husserlian empty intentions of meaning, it is precisely the notion of the "projection of understanding" (*Entwerfen des Verstehens*) – which reveals the entity in the possibility of its being – and the related notion of interpretation (*Auslegung*) should be identified.

4. Heidegger's "turn to Kant" (1929) involves the development of the same problematics that Heidegger initially recognises in Husserl's *Logical Investigations* and Lask's *Logic of Philosophy*. Some of the key conceptual transformations *Critique of Pure Reason*, as observed in Heidegger's interpretation of it, appear to be connected to this. Thus, by placing the transcendental faculty of imagination at the centre of the whole problematic of *Critique of Pure Reason*, Heidegger destroys its very architectonics. However, the foundations of such a deconstructive interpretation can largely be seen in the phenomenological-ontological problematic that is the starting point for Heidegger. This includes, first of all, the phenomenological idea of categorial intuition, the development of which is clearly to be found in Heidegger's explication of the idea of transcendental imagination. In this explication, pure categorial position and pure intuition are interpreted as *structural elements of the original unity* formed in understanding, which Heidegger characterises as the "*transcendental projection*". That is, the faculty of transcendental knowledge is interpreted by Heidegger as the intentionality that reveals the very "objectivity of objects", and its projective and uncreative schematisation (transcendental imagination) as that which forms the horizon of objectivity and relates to the understanding of being (Seinsverständnis). This re-created Heideggerian architectonics of the "pure reason", in turn, implies a redefinition of the very aim and tasks of *Critique of Pure Reason*, which is now reinterpreted as a "theory of being", in which it is not a matter of formulating a general "theory of knowledge", but of formulating the "theory of understanding" as an understanding of being as such.

5. The final point in the development of the transcendental-philosophical problematics in Heidegger's work is the transition to the grounding of the "*metaphysics of Dasein*", with which the closure of the project of fundamental ontology appears to be connected. It is here that a certain shift in the method and content of Heidegger's philosophy is revealed.

Along with the development of fundamental ontology as the transcendental philosophical project, including the theory of understanding developed by the early Heidegger, his attempt to provide fundamental ontology with an ontic foundations can also be traced here. This is expressed primarily in the fact that the very investigation of the faculty of transcendental of knowledge (understanding), which engages Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, is now carried out within the framework of a metaphysical perspective that defines the understanding also through the "relation to entities as a whole" into which the "existing Dasein" enters. Thus, whereas in *Being and Time* it is still a question of the "metaphysically neutral" Dasein in its relation to what "to be" means for it, in *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* this question is replaced with the metaphysical perspective on the human being – in its *relation to* the world as the *totality of entities*, in which the "understanding of being" is to be determined from this relation. Consequently, during this period, there was the transformation in Heidegger's research perspective, which may be considered as the beginning of a new, metaphysical stage in the evolution of his thought.

Scientific novelty of the Study

In contrast to works devoted to the study of "the early Heidegger", which analyse and reconstruct as far as possible the whole range of Heidegger's thought, the present study offers a more selective identification and definition of the problems that constitute the subject-matter of this dissertation. The scientific novelty of the study is thus determined by the very framework of the problems recognised in this dissertation. These problems, as it was found in the course of the study, involve several points of development.

The very formulation of Heidegger's question of being as the question of categories was established as the "zero point" of Heidegger's philosophy in this

study. It was demonstrated that the primary development of this question is predominantly conducted within the context of neo-Kantian epistemology (the Southwestern school), which Heidegger mainly acquired through the works of Emil Lask. The consideration of the neo-Kantian starting point of Heidegger's philosophising in this study has in turn allowed to take a new perspective on the development of Heidegger's early philosophical project, namely the period of his "phenomenological decade", in which he adapts of Husserl's philosophical method. Here, within the framework of Heidegger's developing ontological theory of categories, the specificity of which allows it to be called a theory of understanding, the significance of the phenomenological idea of categorial intuition was revealed and the key conceptual transformations of this idea carried out by Heidegger in fundamental ontology were established. Finally, Heidegger's "turn to Kant" (1929) and his new phenomenological interpretation of *Critique of Pure Reason*, with which he presented a new phenomenological interpretation of *Critique of Pure Reason*, and with which the closure of the project of fundamental ontology appears to be connected, was examined as the last point in the development of Heidegger's transcendental philosophy. It has been demonstrated that Heidegger's investigation of the faculty of transcendental knowledge as the faculty of "understanding of being" (Seinsverständnis) on the one hand represents a logical development of the problems that he identified earlier in the works of Husserl and Lask. However, it also captures a new conceptual shift, which is the last one within the project of the early Heidegger's philosophy, considered here as the project of transcendental philosophy.

As a result, the study reconstructed Heidegger's initial theory of meaning and categories by drawing on the works of Lask, Husserl and Kant. On this basis, the conceptual connections in the above works that are relevant to the

research problems were traced, a number of key concepts of Heidegger's fundamental ontology were clarified and placed in their original context.

Theoretical and Practical Outcome of the Study

The results obtained in this study clarify and complement the line of analysis of the genesis of the basic concepts of Heidegger's philosophy that has been outlined in the research literature, and reconstruct the range of initial problems and questions of Heidegger's phenomenological philosophy. In doing so, the study also contributes to deepening and concretising the problems of phenomenological philosophy. The findings of the present study can be employed to develop special courses that are focused on the practices of slow reading and in-depth engagement with the concepts of phenomenological philosophy.

Structure of the Study

The study consists of an introduction, three chapters, a conclusion and a list of references. In the first chapter the problem of the categories in Heidegger is formulated, the conceptual connections between the philosophical project of the early Heidegger and the *Logic of Philosophy* of the neo-Kantian Lask are investigated. The second chapter reconstructs the specificity of the phenomenological theory of meaning. This includes the reconstruction of the phenomenological idea of truth and the idea of the categorial intuition, as well as the identification of these ideas and their conceptual transformations in the works of the early Heidegger. The third chapter examines Heidegger's interpretation of *Critique of Pure Reason*, identifies its phenomenological foundations, and explores Heidegger's development of the "metaphysics of

Dasein". The conclusion presents a summary of the study's results and offers the conclusions on the three chapters.

MAIN BODY OF THE DISSERTATION

The **introduction** shows the relevance of the study, describes the extent of prior investigation of the topic, defines the object and subject-matter of the study, indicates the methodological and theoretical framework of the study, formulates the study tasks and objective, formulates statements to be defended, describes the scientific novelty of the study, the theoretical and practical outcome, indicates the author's publications on the topic of the dissertation.

The **first chapter** "The early Heidegger: Between Neo-Kantianism and Phenomenology" is devoted to the study of the connection between the Lask's neo-Kantian philosophy and the early Heidegger's phenomenological philosophy. **Section 1.1.** "The Problem of Categories" examines the beginning of Heidegger's philosophising, which, as this section shows, was marked by the ideas of developing the question of categories as the question of being. As Heidegger notes, he initially interpreted his "question of being" precisely as the "problem of categories". "Zero point" of Heidegger's philosophy is fixed in this section in his very transition from neo-Kantianism to phenomenology. It is noted that Heidegger's initial turn to phenomenological philosophy is carried out largely through the writings of the neo-Kantian Lask, which lead him to return to the problems of Husserl's *Sixth* Logical Investigation, where the phenomenological concept of categorial intuition is developed. However, further adaptation of the phenomenological method is carried out by Heidegger throughout his "phenomenological decade", during which he transforms virtually all the basic concepts of phenomenology. Therefore, this section also raises one of the main questions of the study, how exactly Heidegger adapts the

idea of categorical intuition in his own philosophical project, first of all, in the treatise *Being and Time*, after the publication of which, in fact, the first discussions about the conceptual unity of the two versions of phenomenology emerge.

Section 1.2 discusses the assumption of the influence of the neo-Kantian philosophical tradition (transcendental philosophy of values) on the early Heidegger, since the first stage of Heidegger's philosophical development took place within the Baden school founded in Freiburg by G. Rickert. Some aspects from his earliest works are examined, allowing us to argue that the premise from which Heidegger proceeds in these works is a cultural-philosophical teleological (value) interpretation of history, which determines – though not methodologically, but substantively – the philosophical problems Heidegger develops later on. At the same time, it is noted that Heidegger emerges from the direct influence of neo-Kantian epistemology rather quickly. Thus, Heidegger's phenomenological decade was already marked by an explicit polemic with the Neo-Kantians, in particular with the theoretical ways of treating the problems of history. Moreover, after the publication of *Being and Time*, a new stage in the development of Heidegger's philosophical thought begins. At this time he offers his own "phenomenological-metaphysical" interpretation of Kant's doctrine, which in turn was seen by his contemporaries as a challenge to school – neo-Kantian – philosophy. The exception in a certain sense here is the logical-philosophical doctrine of the neo-Kantian Lask. The conceptual connection between Lask's doctrine and Heidegger's phenomenological doctrine of being, as noted in this section, can be traced directly to *Being and Time*.

Section 1.3. *On the Way to Being and Time: The Question of Being in its Connection with the Philosophical Doctrine of E. Lask* is devoted to the study of the conceptual connection between the works of Lask and of the early Heidegger. The principle of ontological differentiation stands out as the main

structural moment of the logic of these doctrines, the first model of which for Heidegger is the neo-Kantian division of the "realm of the conceivable" into the spheres of "being" and "validity". It is noted that this division is also made in the same form in Lask's *Logic of Philosophy*. In the work Lask, in order to designate the logical aspect of all that exists, resorts to the expression introduced into philosophical circulation by G. Lotze, "it is valid" (das gilt). In his earliest writings Heidegger employs the same expression within the framework of a similar differentiation of the spheres of the "physical," "psychical," "metaphysical," and that which is "valid", and for the early Heidegger it becomes a designation of a special "form of reality" of the sense. Moreover, the very notion of "being" is defined in the same way in Lask and Heidegger, as is shown in this section: Lask, as well as Heidegger later, defines being initially negatively – as radically "Not-entities" (Nichtseiendes), alien to the realm of the "sensory" or the "supersensory" (metaphysical). In other words, being turned here into the logical predicate of everything that exists, which is as something that is only "valid", forms the very field of philosophical inquiry.

Section 1.4 treats Lask's emerging doctrine of meaning as a kind of *proto-phenomenological investigation* of the pre-theoretical *realm of validity*. Lask's critique of the "two worlds theory" is discussed, which, at the same time, constitutes a critique of metaphysics. The latter, according to Lask, proceeds from a dualism that divides the realm of the conceivable into "hemispheres" of the "sensory" and the "supersensory". As a result of that, the sphere of "logical validity" remains unrecognised in the metaphysical tradition. It is noted that in a similar way Heidegger formulates the problem of the "oblivion of the question of being" in metaphysics, the categorial apparatus of which was developed for the "sphere" of entities and therefore turned out to be completely unsuitable for the thematization of the meaning/truth of being itself.

This section also notes that the task of conceptualising the sphere of validity in Lask involves a renewed Kant's transcendental-logical investigation. In doing so, however, Lask expands the very scope of the implementation of categories. Categories of the new order in Lask become the transcendental forms of validity or "constitutive categories" as "truths" about the specifically "nonsensory". In this very extension of the scope of categorial implementation, in turn, it is possible to trace the closeness of the problematics of Lask's logical-philosophical doctrine to the phenomenological doctrine of Husserl, who in the *Sixth Logical Investigation* also departs from a simply semantic understanding of categories and from an understanding of "givenness" narrowed to the sphere of the sensory intuited, founding the "givenness" of categorial forms and ideas themselves in acts of categorial intuition.

In addition, since Lask's "givenness" becomes the nonsensory validity (Geltung), conceptualised as the meaning and "value" dimension of philosophy, this section also concludes that Lask's *Logic of philosophy* presents an analysis of the "pre-theoretical" level of life. This level becomes the meaningful dimension of experience itself, the subjective aspect of which is described by Lask in terms of a specific "devotion" (Hingabe) to the nonsensory. At the same time, such "pre-reflexive" experience for Lask, even in its simplest forms, as well as in the phenomenological doctrine of intentionality, turns out to be indecomposable to sensory perception and non-reducible to mental experience. It can be called unreflexive dissolution in the forms of validity themselves – in the meaningful reality. Hence it is concluded that Lask is forming a doctrine of the "objective" constitution of meaning, which he calls not panlogism but the panarchy of the logos. The latter treats reality as "categorically charged", and proceeds from the position that the irrational moment of facticity is fundamentally irresistible.

The panarchy of the logos, in turn, as noted in this and the next section, can be compared to Heidegger's doctrine of the meaning of being, since in the latter, first, being is treated as that which *is* not, but that which is "*given*" exclusively in *understanding*, that is, it also presupposes the specific "theory of meaning". Furthermore, in this doctrine, a precondition for the categorial and existential explication of the meaning of facticity is a return to the "non-thematized fact of understanding of being", which in *Being and Time* is revealed in the analysis of everyday life and in the investigation of the meaningful constitution (Bedeutsamkeit) of the "world". It is thus suggested that the common element of Lask's logico-philosophical doctrine and Heidegger's phenomenological doctrine of being may be the "doctrine of meaning" formed in them, which is similar in its principles.

Section 1.5. continues to explore the conceptual relationship between the writings of Lask and the works of the early Heidegger and turns to the "theory of meaning" that takes shape within Heidegger's fundamental ontology. It is noted that the conceptual structure of *Being and Time* includes many neologisms. However, among the new concepts of fundamental ontology there are also some terminological borrowings from Lask's *Logic of Philosophy*, as well as such concepts which, although they are not direct borrowings, can be perceived as analogs of some concepts of the *Logic of Philosophy*. Among these, this section discusses the concepts of "care" and "intimacy (Vertrautheit) of the world" as concepts that seem to derive from Lask's idea of "devotion to the nonsensory" (Hingabe), as well as the untranslatable concepts of "Bewandtnisganzheit" and "Bewandtnis". The latter in Lask served as a designation for objective truth "in concreto". It is therefore suggested that an investigation of the grounds for the adaptation of this particular term in Heidegger's fundamental ontology also requires revealing the possible implications in the text of *Being and Time* that refer to Lask's concept of truth.

In addition, this section discusses concepts of fundamental ontology such as "environing world" (Umwelt), "meaningfulness", "reference", etc. It is noted that the very notion of "world" in Heidegger's fundamental ontology also goes back to the neo-Kantian notion of the reality of validity, since T. Kisiel has shown that Heidegger's idiosyncratic expression "es weltet" was originally invented by analogy with recognizable impersonal sentences such as "es gilt", "es soll", "es wertet", etc.

At the same time, this section states that all the above concepts, despite the fact that their origins can be found in one way or another in Lask's *Logic of Philosophy*, undergo a certain development in fundamental ontology. For example, the "environing world" (Umwelt) in *Being and Time* is no longer the "spiritual world" of the Neo-Kantians, in which all objects are objects of the culture with "value characteristics," or even Husserl's "meaningful Universe". All things of the environing world in the fundamental ontology are transformed from the something merely "on hand" into the "ready-to-hand". At the same time, this ready-to-hand being in Heidegger, when "operable", is a genus of "referring being" from which a "totality of meaningful references" is formed. In other words, all being encountered in everyday life, according to Heidegger, actually dissolves into the formal or even signifying structure of its being, and this formal and objectively "constituted" being of entity is in turn explicated by Heidegger as something primary, more primordial than the fact of the "bare availability" of entities. Hence it is concluded that Heidegger's fundamental ontology forms a specific theory of meaning, in which the phenomenon of "referring being" itself becomes the starting point, and which presupposes the identification of the sign structure of being as a "characteristic of all entities in general".

This conception of the formal structure of the being of entities is compared in this section with Lask's doctrine of transcendental forms, in which

"objective" reality is constituted and which are defined in his *Logic of Philosophy* as a kind of reference or validity-to (Hingeltung). Lask believes that the transcendental forms are not the pure forms of mind according to which the "thing" is bringen. The neo-Kantian teleological model of knowledge is replaced here by the principle of "material determination" developed by Lask, which in turn means that all transcendental forms as "validity-to" are not subjective forms of mind, but individual meanings motivated by the "thing itself". Because of this, the concept of truth close to realism takes shape in Lask's philosophy. The process of thinking and knowing here can be defined as a special form of intentionality – it is a form of conjugation with the "objective reality", with the object of thinking, the specific "clarity about" which the thinking itself is. It is also noted that Lask's concept of the "circumstantial nexus" (Bewandtnis), which Heidegger adapts in *Being and Time* in a similar context, arises in this connection. At the same time, this objective moment of the "circumstantial nexus" of entities as that which is independent of the cognising subject is described by Lask as the "affectedness" of the things with a form of validity and as the "enlightenment" of its "material". This "transparency" of things can be associated with the "objectivity" of the world and its meaningful constitution, which is what makes the world far more "real" than the accessible entities themselves. However, Heidegger still calls the very disclosedness of Da the primordial "lighting of the clearing" (Lichtung). In this respect, Heidegger goes further than Lask: the being of all the "ready-to-hand" as the initial, even if not the "nearest" given being, must ultimately lead Heidegger to the questioning of the being of the very "agent" of understanding – of being of Dasein's itself, as well as to the new understanding of "Sense", which in fundamental ontology is defined not only as the logical constitution of the world, but also as the Dasein's existential.

The conclusion is that within the framework of Heidegger's fundamental ontology, the theory of understanding, consistent with its internal structure, becomes more or less coherent, and this theory – even at this stage – still incorporates elements of Lask's logico-philosophical doctrine. It is also noted that this theory of understanding is based on the concept of understanding of being as a projection (*Entwerfen des Verstehens*) of meanings, and requires explication not only in its relation to Lask's philosophical conception, but, besides that, in its relation to Husserl's phenomenological idea of intentionality.

The **second chapter** of this study *The Doctrine of Meaning and the Categories* reveals some features of the phenomenological theory of meaning, which takes shape in Husserl's *Logical Investigations* and is developed in Heidegger and, in part, in the writings of the neo-Kantian Lask. The present chapter starts from the consideration of phenomenological philosophy, including M. Heidegger's philosophy of being, as a transcendental-philosophical investigation that explains the *structure of meaning* as a condition for the discoveredness of the being of entities. The transcendental character of phenomenological philosophy is revealed in this chapter primarily through the demonstration of the following statement: the subject of phenomenological investigation is not a "thing" and its "real" qualities, but rather the emphasis in phenomenology is shifted from the "thing" itself to the examination of the *ways* in which it is given. It is also demonstrated that the phenomenological theory of intentionality assumes as the main structural element of the analysis of perception the unity of acts of signification and intuition. The very phenomenological distinction of these acts goes back to the notion of the two possible modes of "givenness" of the object: thinking (*Denken*) and intuition (*Anschauung*), which, as Kant knows, represent two roots of the unified process of knowledge. The ultimate aim of this chapter is to show that Heidegger's fundamental ontology remains the transcendental investigation insofar as it

explicates structures of understanding, or even pre-understanding, and insofar as Heidegger's explication of these structures also presupposes the phenomenological notion of an empty and intuitively fulfilled intentions of meaning, that is, the possibility of categorial intuition.

Section 2.1. explains the main distinctions of the phenomenological theory of meaning. It is noted that in Husserl's *Logical Investigations* the philosophical theory of meaning is developed, the foundation of which becomes the analysis of perception. It is also noted that in each of the six investigations of this two-volume work of Husserl he thematises and substantiates at different levels the key phenomenological distinction between the *meaning-bestowing* intention and the *fulfilling* intention. In the last sixth investigation, where the whole work reaches its climax, Husserl proceeds to elaborate on the phenomenological idea of "categorial intuition", which provides a full ontological basis for his initially conceived "Bedeutungslehre", and which, for Heidegger, becomes a key element in the theoretical foundation of his question of being. Phenomenological investigation, the idea of which is explained in this section, thus consists of a series of ascents: first, from 'logical-linguistic' or linguistic analysis (Sprachanalyse) to the analysis of thinking (Denkanalyse), which, according to Husserl, cannot be exhausted by an examination of exclusively discursive and signifying thinking. Therefore, from the analysis of thinking in the *Logical Investigations* a transition is also made to the analysis of fulfilled thinking, namely to the analysis of intuition (Anschauungsanalyse) and its stages. This is where phenomenological investigation actually begins.

Such an indication of the possibility of achieving this "intuitive fulfilment" as the ultimate goal of phenomenological knowledge is also contained in the interpretation of the concept of "phenomenology" in Heidegger's *Being and Time*, where the true meaning of this concept, as a result of his tracing back of both root bases of the word "phenomenology" to a single

verb "ἀποφαίνεσθαι", becomes "to let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself". However, as noted in this section, it would be wrong to understand the "intuitive fulfilment" of phenomenology as intellectual intuition, and the phenomena of phenomenology as something of a 'non-linguistic' character, to be found only in "intuition". The latter is not achieved outside of the meaningfulness. The very structure of Husserl's investigation suggests this: in the first logical investigation the phenomenology of "linguistic expression" (Ausdruck) is outlined, and here Husserl rejects the idea of any representation of "meaning" outside of its linguistic expression.

In addition, this section, as well as the subsequent ones, demonstrates that distinguishing between meaning-bestowing intentionality and intuitive intentions also involves the foundation for the *specificity of the phenomenon of meaning*. For, according to Husserl, meaning, since being the content of all intentionality and its accomplishment (Leistung), always has a specific "surplus" (Überschuss in der Bedeutung) in relation to what is perceived. Consequently, the intention of meaning cannot be reduced to an intuitive intention. It has its own content, which cannot be exhausted either in perception and intuition or in "psychic experience". At the same time, it is this surplus of meaning that guarantees the correspondence between what is expressed and what is perceived. This is why phenomenology considers language as the sphere in which experience can be most *adequately* expressed.

Section 2.2. explores intentionality as the sphere in which, according to Husserl, the sign becomes the bearer of the meaning, that is, as the sphere of "animating" "*meaning-bestowing*" acts and acts of *fulfilment*. It is noted that these meaningful signs (bedeutsames Zeichen) are first of all speech, which, according to Husserl, is not just a "vibration of the voice": "perceiving" a speech sign, according to Husserl, we do not so much hear or see it as some external,

sensory perceived "object" as we directly understand what it *means*. And since the understanding of meaning is never motivated by the perception of the sign itself, Husserl concludes that along with the act of perception there must be some other "act" that "animates" this perception, i.e. the *intention of meaning*. From the problem of linguistic expression, therefore, Husserl turns to the investigation of these special "acts" – the intentions of meaning and the stages of their fulfilment.

The theory of intentionality is therefore considered in this section as the foundation of the phenomenological "theory of meaning and sense". The main purpose of this section is to show that the grounding of meaning in the intentional act does not mean that meaning itself is treated in phenomenology as a "mental phenomenon" or as a derivative of psychic experience. It is demonstrated that Husserl departs from the Brentanian notion of intentionality and the related distinction between "psychic" and "physical" phenomena, and develops an entirely new notion of "*meaning-intentionality*". This means that in phenomenology intention is not at all understood as a "mental act" and "mental representation" as its inner content, but strictly as an "act" *endowed with meaning*. Meaning, on the other hand, is not an "internal" phenomenon; it belongs to the "objective" linguistic reality and forms a separate logical domain of "reality" – the "realm of the sense". Meaning as the content of intentionality cannot therefore be constituted by anything 'mental' or "*psychical*", and the intention of meaning itself is distinct from the mental act as a mental event.

The intention of meaning, which in *Logical Investigations* is understood as any act that "means something", has, moreover, a logical constitution of its own. Since this act is "endowed with meaning", it also functions as an "indication" of its "object" and always presupposes a signifying expression. This means, among other things, that meaning in phenomenology remains a *linguistic phenomenon*, the specificity of which is substantiated in the analysis

of intentionality. In this context, the connection between the theory of phenomena and the idea of three semantic levels (sign-object-sense), which appears in *Logical Investigations*, is also noted. It is demonstrated that, like Frege, Husserl investigates the sense as a separate semantic level and as a so-called "*third instance*".

Besides, the development of the idea of meaning-intentionality can also be traced in Heidegger's early works. This section discusses his habilitation thesis devoted to the "doctrine of categories and meaning" in Duns Scotus. It is noted that Heidegger's reconstruction of Duns Scotus' doctrine of meaning presupposes the phenomenological intuition that everything that is "*objective*" and consistent with consciousness (*bewußtseinsmäßig*), that is, everything that is intentional, can be *expressed in meanings*. In this context, Heidegger discusses the distinction between the object "given in *Species intelligibilis*" and the object "as such" in Duns Scotus, interpreting the *Species intelligibilis* as an intended object or "modus" in which the object "presents itself to consciousness in its presence". At the same time Heidegger criticises the psychological interpretation of the "presence of the object for consciousness" as a certain "event in the soul", because then, according to Heidegger, it is impossible to explain the *phenomenon of the meaning* itself: if we understand meaning psychologically, it becomes a mental phenomenon, a representation, which still has to be somehow connected with the linguistic sign. According to Heidegger, the sphere of "inner experience" is not the sphere in which meanings are constituted. The meaning, as something that belongs to linguistic reality, must also be related to its *object*, and therefore the theory of meaning requires the development of a corresponding theory of the intentionality. In this connection, it is suggested that Duns Scotus' idea of the "intelligible species", as reconstructed in Heidegger's work, is in many ways comparable to the phenomenological idea of how the "*empty intentions of meaning*" function.

Moreover, it is suggested that Heidegger made one of the first attempts in this work to adapt the idea of the meaning intention, which would later be included in his theory of understanding in *Being and Time* as projection (projecting of meaning).

Section 2.3. continues to explore the phenomenological theory of meaning, but turns to Lask's philosophical strategy, which he calls the "panarchy of the logos". The latter, as demonstrated in this section, reinforces the logic of phenomenological investigation. It is noted that Lask develops a theory of meaning as the "*truth*" about the object, which is realised in its otherness in relation to the object – as something fundamentally *non-sensory* (Unsinnliches) and *non-existent*. It is also noted that this discrepancy between "object" and its "meaningfulness", as conceptualised by Lask, presupposes something as the theory of intentionality. For Lask, however, the latter is replaced by the idea of an objective formal-material relationship, in terms of which the structure of all intelligible reality is described. The role of the meaning-bestowing act in Lask's doctrine is thus fulfilled by the form of validity (Geltung), which, like the phenomenological "consciousness of", turns into "validity-to" (Hingeltung). In such a "meaning-bestowing act" the "object itself" is not exhausted: as an "X" to be defined, beyond its form of validity, it is outside of any logicalisation. Therefore, as in the phenomenological doctrine, one can qualify as "true" here only that "openness" which the very mode of its "givenness" provides to the "object".

In addition, it is demonstrated that the description of intelligible reality in terms of form and material, which for Lask involves a "reflexive" distinction in the "form of validity" between the moments of sense itself and reference to its "material", fits into Husserl's semantic model. The latter also takes into account this "gap" between "object" and "phenomenon": this is how, according to Husserl, speech is functioning. It always seems to "oscillate" between the two

modes of "being" of the sign – the *expression* of meaning and the *indication* of the object. Lask's doctrine of forms of validity and the phenomenological theory of meaning, as noted in this section, are also reflected in Heidegger's idea of "meaningfulness" (Bedeutsamkeit), which is characterised by the same specific duality: it is both the "fullness of meaning" and the "*Be-deutsamkeit*" that "indicates, refers to, signifies" something, that is, it is the meaningfulness of the particular worldliness.

The conclusion of this section is that Lask treats all "entities" as nothing other than the "intended entities" whose "being" is revealed through the "imposition" of a "form of validity" while remaining fundamentally other than the entities itself. The domain of being here is the domain of "objective truth" and the domain of the "valid forms". Thus, it is concluded that Lask's philosophical doctrine of "forms of validity" presents a philosophical description of the original "openness" of the world. However, since the "world of phenomena" is essentially the human world, already in Heidegger we see how this doctrine leads to the questioning of the subject itself, which is the agent of understanding in the world of "forms", namely to the questioning of being of Dasein.

Section 2.4 "*Intuition as the meaning-fulfilling act in the phenomenological analysis of perception*" explores the phenomenological perspective on the structure of knowledge as an a priori relation between meaning and intuition and the related notion of the specific "intuitive givenness" of the categories. In this connection, the section first discusses the specificity of the empty intention of meaning, of *signification*, which in this respect is first contrasted with *intuition*. It is noted that initially, according to Husserl, all meanings, as well as speech acts in general, function symbolically rather than intuitively: speech acts, which are in fact "meaningful signs", do not require mental representations. Language functions according to its own internal rules.

It thus dominates over all perception, which it transforms, making it mainly symbolic. At the same time, the idea of phenomenological "knowledge in the strict sense" presupposes the actualisation of all meanings in intuition.

Phenomenological "intuitive fullness" (Fülle), in turn, in its structure, according to Husserl, is a complete synthesising coincidence of the meaning-bestowing acts and acts of fulfilling of meaning. This intuitive fulfilment of the intention of meaning also implies a gradation of levels of its realisation, which can range from purely symbolic and empty meaning, to a complete synthesising coincidence of meaning with what is given in intuition. At the same time, only the signitive act that has received its full realisation in intuition – i.e. the *ful-filled* intention of meaning – can, according to Husserl, claim the status of "knowledge in the strict sense". At the same time, intentionality, according to Husserl, cannot find its completion in sensibility, in the visibility of perception or representation. Its completion must be what Husserl calls "categorical intuition". Thus, the intentionality of meaning, the possibilities for its fulfilment, and its dissatisfaction are all considered to be structural moments in the phenomenological analysis of perception.

This phenomenological perspective of how the empty and fulfilled intentions of meaning function also reveals itself in Heidegger's fundamental ontology. The present section hypothesises that Heidegger's *Being and Time* develops a specific "theory of understanding" which includes a conception of the empty meaning intentions and the possibilities of their fulfilment. It is suggested that Heidegger's analogy of the empty intention is the "projection of understanding", as in it, the entity is seen through its "possibilities of being". This means that entity, according to Heidegger, always primordially discovers itself in the modus of some meaningfulness, and the projection of understanding in fundamental ontology is a kind of projective anticipation that is realised even before the moment of its explicit discovery.

The explication of these structures must be carried out through phenomenological investigation. For Heidegger, this therefore turns into hermeneutics, the interpretation of entities "towards their being". Intuitiveness is here the very "mode of the encounter of the being in the *modus phenomena*" in which phenomena, as Heidegger notes in the introduction to *Being and Time*, are to be reached "intuitively" (*intuitiv*) and "originally" (*originär*). For this reason, the conclusion of this section also suggests that Heidegger's phenomenological method must be based on a certain idea of the "evidence", and that this idea itself must be rooted in a phenomenological conception of truth.

Section 2.5. continues to investigate the specificity of the phenomenological acts of identification, i.e. such acts in which the *ultimate coincidence* of meaning and intuition takes place. Husserl also calls them evident perception or *evidence*. It is noted that the peculiarity of these acts is that, along with the "real correlate", they also give the "*being*" of the intended, which can be qualified as "*true*". This "being-true" is in turn experienced as a specific *relation* between what is meant in the act and what is given in intuition. Thus in the phenomenological idea of evident perception, evidence itself is defined "in the strict sense" and elevated to the notion of truth, which can now be defined as the "coincidence" that characterises this *ontological relation of the identity* of the meant and the given in intuition.

This section demonstrates that *Being and Time* contains an interpretation of the truth as the "coincidence". The latter is concealed here by the formalisation of this idea to the relation "*as being – just as*", which means that intuition gives the object exactly as it is intended in the act that meant it. As noted above, Husserl initially carries out an "extension" of the notion of truth – beyond proposition – through which truth receives a productive interpretation in the sphere of intentional acts. In this context, it is demonstrated that the

properties of phenomenological evident acts can also be revealed in Heidegger's *Being and Time* in the idea of "understanding-interpreting sight", which is characteristic of practical actions aimed at orientation in the world.

Moreover, as noted in this section, Heidegger, in the key paragraphs of *Being and Time* that thematise the idea of the truth, reproduces some of the ways of the thought developed by Husserl in *Logical Investigations*. Thus, the starting point for him becomes, as for Husserl, the analysis of the property of an proposition "to be true or false" or "the being-true of an proposition" (Wahrsein der Aussage), that is, the connection between the concept of truth and the idea of logos apophantikos. However, Heidegger goes on to conclude that the "being-true of the proposition" must be interpreted as a "being-discovering", and that the original phenomenon of truth itself consists in existential "disclosedness". In this connection, this section presents the critical arguments of E. Tugendhat, according to whom Heidegger's concept of truth loses its specificity as a result of its "unprecedented expansion" from the specific truth of a proposition to the disclosedness of being in general.

E. Tugendhat's arguments, in turn, are countered with the following. The connection of the idea of truth in paragraph 44 of *Being and Time* with Husserl's original definition of truth in the *VI Logical Investigation* is substantiated. It is noted that although Heidegger modifies virtually all the key terms in this paragraph, his new concept of truth as discoveredness is derived from the phenomenological idea of the evidence. It is demonstrated that there is still the structure of *identification* at the heart of the discoveredness, since as discoveredness is interpreted here as nothing more than the relation of "*as being – just as*" or the relation of identity between that "*which is put forward in the assertion*" and the "*entity's showing itself*". By "identity" (Selbigkeit) here is meant a specific "certification" that refers to the ontological identification established by the coinciding of the "meant" and the "given" in intuition.

Thus, it has been proved that the definition of discoveredness (Entdecktheit), introduced by Heidegger, is an analogue of the Husserlian idea of identification. It retains a connection to the assertion and is used in fundamental ontology to characterise the being of an entity that is *categorically* defined, i.e. not the being of Dasein. However, the logic of the investigation of the phenomenon of truth in Being and Time also has its own specificity, which reveals itself first of all in the questioning of "being-discovering" itself. "The primordial phenomenon of truth" here becomes the existential "disclosedness" (Erschlossenheit) that characterises Dasein's relation to its *own being*. With regard to the idea of disclosedness, in turn, the question that is raised in the critical literature, particularly in E. Tugendhat's article – whether it has to do with the idea of truth or it is a "*phenomenon of its own kind*" discovered by Heidegger – seems to be more legitimate.

In this connection, on the one hand, it is noted that Heidegger's idea of "disclosedness" definitely excludes identification as the actualisation, which presupposes a moment of "perception". However, at the same time, it is demonstrated that instead of the idea of evident perception, the constitutive moment of understanding of Dasein in Heidegger becomes the specific "visibility" or "transparency" of Dasein, which it has in relation to its own being. Heidegger here, though, denies the possibility of a perceiving relation to Dasein's own being, which by the way has always been rejected in the philosophical tradition, since any definitions of the "I" given through forms of sensibility are inadequate for the "I" as an intelligence. However, as shown in this section, for Heidegger, *time* itself becomes a pure form of Dasein's self-affectation and therefore it functions as a foundation that creates the "ground" for the application of "categories" in cognition of the existence of oneself, namely for the "ontological interpretation of the "I" as such. This gives

rise to the idea of existential analytics, which was supposed to become a more radical version of phenomenology, explicating not categories, but existentials.

At the same time, as noted in the conclusion of this section, existential analytics does not replace the categorical analysis of perception, it opens up another opportunity for the conceptualisation of being, which is carried out along with the first one. Here one can observe the so-called Heidegger's "transformation of the categorical", the essence of which is the transition *from categories to existentials*. However, the explication of the relationship between existentials and categories still remains a problem.

Section 2.6. discusses the phenomenological concept of categorial intuition, thematised by Husserl in the last, VI "*Logical Investigation*", as an idea that forms the *original* problematics of phenomenological philosophy and is *developed* in both Husserl's later works and in Heidegger's early works. The direct connection of the idea of categorial intuition with the phenomenological concept of truth is noted, since the foundations of the latter, as shown in the previous section, consist in a certain idea of thinking based on the possibility of intuitive fulfilment of initially empty intentions of meaning. The fulfilment of the intention of meaning, which is the act of absolute coincidence between the "meant" and the "intuited", presupposes, in turn, the categorial intuition, in which every intention finds its completion. The idea of categorial intuition in this regard is considered here as the "telos" and the completion of all of the intentional acts.

This section therefore begins with a reconstruction of the analysis of the idea of intentionality presented in Husserl's *Logical Investigations*. The complexity of its structure is noted, since it has a "stepwise" structure, in which, according to Husserl, the act of categorial intuition and the sensibility founding it should be distinguished. First, this section discusses the specifics of acts of a

direct perception, the correlate of which is a "real object", which is also any "possible object of direct perception". The connection of this act with linguistic expression is noted: namely, that it is the realisation of a simple "nominative positing" or a simple "naming", which, according to Husserl, can always be completed to a full sentence.

At the same time, it is demonstrated that in relation to the full sentence and its "objectivity", according to Husserl, it cannot be argued that something from a direct perception can correspond to it. The full sentence always has a kind of "intentional surplus" of meaning in relation to the perceived. However, despite the indicated discrepancy between what is expressed and what is perceived, according to Husserl, not only direct intentions can reach their intuitive fulfilment. Husserl comes to the conclusion that complex positings involving full sentences must find their "identification" in another act, different from the direct perception. He calls these acts categorial intuition.

In this regard, it is concluded that the categories in *Logical Investigations* are explored as ideal correlates of these complex founded acts. Being the "givenness" of a specific act of fulfilment of a sentence, they thus belong to the ideal constitution of the object itself, which receives its expression in an assertion. It is noted that as a result of the identification of acts of the second stage in the structure of perception in phenomenology, the concept of "object" itself is expanded to its categorial structure.

In Heidegger, in turn, the interpretation of the idea of categorial intuition can be found in the lecture course *Prolegomena to the history of the concept of time*, which in this regard is a kind of exegesis of "Logical Investigations". Heidegger here, like Husserl, supposes that every intentional act has the stepwise structure and realises its purpose only through categorial intuition. He points out that these new acts constituted on the basis of direct perception and

use the objective correlate of the simple acts as the foundation for their own objectivity. Therefore, the philosophical treatment of the categories, according to Heidegger, is possible solely through the investigation of the "ideal" forms, which are given in the intentional acts, that are able to *fulfil the assertion*. Hence, it is concluded that, from *Logical Investigations*, Heidegger learned first of all that the categories are not the product of mental activity, since their very nature is in a certain sense "objective". In this regard, it is noted that for Heidegger, the source of all categoriality and meaningfulness is the pre-predicative dimension of being itself, and categorial intuition becomes the starting point of his ontological investigation, since, as Heidegger himself points out, only through categorial intuition can the "*phenomenal givenness of the being*" be achieved.

In addition, the meaningful connection between *Prolegomena* and *Being and Time* is noted. Thus, one of the main functions of categorial intuition, which Heidegger points out in the *Prolegomena*, is as follows: the founded acts, according to Heidegger, *rediscover* directly given objects so that the latter are explicitly grasped and precisely "as such", in "what they are". In other words, in categorial intuition, an entity is interpreted in *its being*, namely as *it is*. This function of assertion to make something "evident" has been the subject of Heidegger's analysis more than once. In particular, in *Being and Time*, Heidegger interprets the assertion as "discovering letting to see." Hence, it is concluded that, in *Being and Time*, Heidegger does not consider assertion as such, but the specific acts of realisation of the assertion. That is, the acts of categorial intuition. This, in turn, should mean that categorial intuition in Heidegger's fundamental ontology functions mainly as an (linguistic) *expression*.

The conclusion of the section also concludes that Heidegger's investigation involves the systematic development of ideas embedded in *Logical*

Investigations. However, Heidegger redefines virtually all phenomenological concepts in accordance with tasks that go beyond the scope of Husserl's project of phenomenology. The concepts of intuition and thinking analysed in this chapter become elements of Heidegger's theory of understanding, but they are also redefined here in the logic of "reduction to the primordial phenomena" that build the understanding. At the same time, the story of conceptual transformations associated with the idea of categorial intuition does not end with the publication of *Being and Time*. Later, this idea, as well as some other key ideas of phenomenology, receive a new foundation in Heidegger's interpretation of Kant's idea of the productive imaginative capacity in transcendental knowledge.

The **third chapter** of this study addresses Heidegger's interpretation of the *Critique of Pure Reason* as a continuation of his project of fundamental ontology. **Section 3.1** discusses some features of Heidegger's fundamental ontology, which indicate that it remains a transcendental philosophical project. It is noted that Heidegger, in the period several years before writing the treatise, actually rediscovers Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, after which the idea of a fundamentally ontological interpretation of *Critique of Pure Reason* becomes one of the main directions of his philosophical work. As is well known, initially it was supposed to be included in the second part of the treatise *Being and Time* as one of its sections, however, Heidegger eventually formalised it into a separate book *Kant and the problem of metaphysics*. Thus, it is obvious that Heidegger saw the development of fundamental ontology at that time in the direction of a new interpretation of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, in which, as Heidegger himself notes, the foundation of metaphysics provided by Kant should be understood as "the disclosure of the inner possibility of ontology".

In this regard, this section explores some features of Heidegger's interpretation of the idea of "transcendental investigation", presented in the

book *Kant and the Problem of metaphysics*. Firstly, it is noted that Heidegger understands transcendental knowledge as the "transcendence of pure reason" as the possibility of its "adjustment" to the "possible object of experience." It is noted that this definition not only indicates the transcendental nature of the investigation itself, but also has a more special meaning: transcendence as "adjustment to the possible object of experience" here denotes a specific relation (to entities as a whole), which is established *in advance* and outlined in the *understanding of the being* of these entities. Heidegger, therefore, understands the transcendental investigation as "ontological knowledge", which is a prior *understanding of being* entities.

Secondly, since the definition refers to transcendence as adjustment to the possible object of experience, it is noted that Heidegger intentionally refers to the classical idea of truth in Kant, to the idea of adequation of "reason" and "thing". It is assumed that Heidegger's basis for such an interpretation is the phenomenological idea of truth as the identification or coinciding of the "meant" and the "intuited".

Thirdly, it is noted that in interpreting the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Heidegger puts at the centre of its entire problematics the problem of "*relation to the object*" (Gegenstandbeziehung) and "*relation to the world*" (Weltbezug), which, as an ability to relate to entities as a whole, also becomes the main feature of the "existence", defined on this basis as the being-in-the-world in fundamental ontology. The core of Kant's philosophical investigation, as interpreted by Heidegger, is the development of the "theory of understanding", which is based on the study of the faculty of transcendental imagination as the faculty to discover the "*objectivity of objects*".

In conclusion, it is demonstrated that Heidegger redefines the very purpose of Kant's investigation. In Heidegger's interpretation, the *Critique of*

Pure Reason turns into the "*theory of the being*" as such, that is, in fact, into fundamental ontology. The latter, being a transcendental investigation, claims to maintain the status of philosophical "scientific investigation" and "the science of the being".

Section 3.2 discusses Heidegger's "turn to Kant", which should be understood not so much as a struggle for the "correct" interpretation of Kant – although this meaning can definitely be traced in Heidegger's works – but as a draft of an unfinished philosophical project by Heidegger, where the central theme would be the development of the "metaphysics of Dasein". In this regard, it is noted that the whole problem of transcendental philosophy undergoes a specific transformation in Heidegger's works. It is demonstrated that the deconstructing interpretation of the *Critique of Pure Reason* presented in the book *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* is mainly due to the problem that Heidegger recognises as the "*homelessness*" of the transcendental imagination in Kant's systematics. It is noted that, according to Heidegger, the faculty of transcendental imagination should not be revealed as an intermediary between thought and intuition, which in Kant, moreover, turns out to be subordinate to the mind function. It must be recognized as the very "protostructure of the finite self", which carries the idea of temporality. This, in turn, according to Heidegger, should entail a redefinition of the very "subject" of knowledge, which in the metaphysical tradition was defined primarily as "spirit" and "mind".

Section 3.3 continues to elaborate on the idea that the book *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* arises from a kind of theory of understanding developed by the early Heidegger, which forms a significant part of the meaningful content of fundamental ontology and receives its development, including through the interpretation of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, especially through the new interpretation of the faculty of transcendental imagination.

However, as demonstrated in this section, Kant's original ideas, including the systematics of the elements of pure knowledge, having passed through phenomenological explication in Heidegger's works, acquire completely new meanings, which eventually turn out to be incompatible with the very principles of Kantian philosophy.

First, it is noted that the problems of fundamental ontology in the transition from *Being and Time* to the work *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* are undergoing a certain evolution: in both works, Dasein's being is explored as an understanding, however, Heidegger's interpretation of the *Critique of Pure Reason* implies a transition from the investigation of the "Dasein's existential constitution" to the "metaphysics of Dasein", in which Dasein is understood as a condition for the possibility of the openness (Offenbarkeit) of the *being of entities in general*. The theoretical foundation of this openness, in turn, is achieved through the deconstructing interpretation of the faculty of transcendental imagination, which turns into "schematizing intuition" as "ontological knowledge" and the understanding of being. The meaning of such deconstruction, as demonstrated in this section, is as follows. In the idea of "schematizing intuition", the concept of understanding – discussed in the previous chapter – as projecting empty intentions of meanings and their intuitive realisation, which also includes "seeing" the possibilities of Dasein's being, is brought into relation to time. After all, it is in Kant scheme represents the unity of notions or categories and the "pure image" of time. For Heidegger, as noted in this section, this unity is no longer synthetic. His goal is to show that all categories, as well as existentials, are initially "images of time".

In this connection, a specific feature of Heidegger's concept of understanding is also discussed, in which the very idea of understanding is interpreted as "*essentially factual*", that is, as "situational" and "non–normative". Since Heidegger defines understanding, on the one hand, as

the "finite intuition" and the "openness of horizon", in which before "entity" its "pure schemes" are projected, and, at the same time, as a factual "projecting", it is concluded that Heidegger's idea of understanding is characterised as "contingent". In other words, Heidegger's idea of "factual understanding" was supposed to dismantle the idea that concepts obtained a priori have a "universal validity" and can be applied to *any* possible experience.

Moreover, along with the position on the idea of a priori, which in Heidegger loses its normative status, his thesis on the "relativity of the truth to Dasein", first put forward in the Davos discussion with E. Cassirer, is also discussed. It is noted that Heidegger's attempt to develop the "metaphysics of Dasein", undertaken by him in the book *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, was also a detailed response to E. Cassirer, in which the foundation of metaphysics is built around an ontological interpretation of the conditions for the discoveredness of the field of "objectivity of object". Thus, the whole problem of *Critique of Pure Reason* is explored here in a certain focus: Heidegger seeks to find the *transcendence* of Dasein as "the inner possibility of a finite being refers to *entities as a whole*". The thesis of the relativity of truth therefore connected with the new idea of metaphysics, which explores the "openness" and "historicity" of the human being and is interpreted by Heidegger as an expression of a certain "understanding of being", "projected and actualised in Dasein as such".

The conclusion of the section notes the following. After the release of *Being and Time* in Heidegger's works, one can observe a reassessment of metaphysics. Despite the fact that in the treatise Heidegger demonstrates rather a critical attitude towards traditional metaphysics, in the period following the publication of the treatise, metaphysics is positively interpreted by Heidegger as an expression of human existence, as an expression of the fullness of reality, comparable to the idea of Leibniz, according to which the concept of reality is

achieved in the representation that unfolds from a unique perspective of the subject-monads. This period is sometimes distinguished in the research literature and characterised as Heidegger's "metaphysical decade" (1927-1937).

Section 3.4 examines the idea of transcendental subjectivity and its explication in Heidegger as a problem of "*relation to the object*" (Gegenstandbeziehung) or relation to the "*objectivity of the object*". In this connection, the *leading meaning* of Kant's "*being*", as revealed by Heidegger, is also noted, which becomes a pure and absolute "positioning" [of the object]. Since the terms as reality and existence (Existenz, Dasein) in Kant do not relate to the real moments of presence of the thing, that is, they do not express the moment of the its factual "presence", Heidegger concludes that they denote not the real properties, but ideal properties of the thing, and therefore also comes to the conclusion that the realm of being is revealed in Kant through the moments of the pure "positioning" of the thing. It is noted that by exploring the structures of the "pure position" of the object, critical philosophy, even before phenomenology, offers philosophical tools to describe the ways "consciousness" encounters its "object", the modes of which are thinking and intuition. Kant's concept of *phenomenon* is also connected with this statement, in which, according to Heidegger, the idea of the "finite understanding" is preliminary outlined, since the thing-in-phenomenon essentially represents the idea of the real entity as it appears within the boundaries set by the structure of pure "sensibility" (intuition) of the subject.

In conclusion, it is clarified that in Kant's investigation of the faculty of transcendental knowledge, only the structures of the possible object of experience are identified. It is noted that it is impossible to define the "subject" itself, as well as the insufficiency of definitions related to the idea of transcendental subjectivity such as: "I think", "unity of apperception", "ego" as "poles of intentional correlation", etc.

Section 3.5 *Subject and the World: the Interpretation of the Idea of Metaphysics in Kant and Leibniz* proceeds to the study of the new concept of metaphysics in Heidegger, which, as Heidegger points out, would not be correct to understand as an expression of a relation to the Absolute. The original experience from which it arises is the experience of "factual existence", which establishes a relation to entities as a whole (das Seiende im Ganzen) and to the "world", that is – the experience of "transcendence of Dasein". Heidegger therefore reads Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* as an already theoretically founded investigation of the faculty of the "subject" to ascend from the object of experience to the realm of the "objectivity of objects", to the realm of the "essentiality" (ουσία) of the entities. However, this section demonstrates that pre-Kantian metaphysics, namely Leibniz's "monadological interpretation of being of entities", also had significance for Heidegger, since, according to Heidegger, it clearly recognises the subject as the "transcending being".

It is assumed that Kant's idea of being as the "absolute positioning" was preceded in this regard by Leibniz's idea of perspectivism, which also played an important role in the development of metaphysics of Dasein. It is noted that in the Leibniz system, each monad is manifested as a *subject*, since each monad is able to establish a relation to "entities in their entirety" from its own unique perspective. In contrast to the idea of the worldless subject, Leibniz's monad thus represents the "living mirror of the world". Moreover, it is noted that Heidegger, guided by the definitions of the monad, characterising it as the potency to represent the totality of entities in the most perfect way – its "*drive*" (Drang) and the idea of "*entelechy*" (perfection) of the monad associated with this concept, defines it as a unit of the *will to understand being*.

On this basis, it is concluded that Heidegger's idea of metaphysics of Dasein, exploring the conditions for the openness of the "*being structure*" of available in the final knowledge of entities, includes both the idea of

perspectivism in Leibniz and the idea of being as an "*absolute position*" in Kant. At the same time, it is noted that Kant's transcendental philosophy is considered by Heidegger in the light of Leibniz's idea of *perspectivism*: Heidegger interprets *Critique of Pure Reason* as an investigation of the way in which a "finite knowing being" can establish a relation to entities as a whole "prior to any experience". It is assumed that within the framework of his own project of fundamental ontology, this interpretation also finds its implication in the ontological investigation of *a priori understanding*, in which, even before its theoretical explication, the beings plan of entities is initially projected.

In addition, the conclusion of the section also notes that the idea of the "understanding of being" (*Seinsverständnis*) is comparable with the pure perception, the analysis of the structure of which, according to Heidegger, Kant explores as the faculty of transcendental imagination. In Heidegger's interpretation, it is therefore explicated as "finite perceiving intuition". The phenomenological grounds for such an interpretation are also noted: first of all, Heidegger seeks to understand it as an intentionality that discovers the objectivity of objects, and the associated idea of projective and uncreative schematization – what forms the horizon of objectivity itself in it and relates to the understanding of being – as an analogue of Husserl's categorial intuition, but more explicitly connected with the idea of temporality.

In the **conclusion** of the dissertation, the main statements and final results of the study are formulated.

The achievement of the purpose of this study is noted, which consisted in identifying the main features of the theory of understanding emerging in the works of the early Heidegger, the foundations of which lie in the transcendental phenomenological approach of his philosophy. It was also demonstrated that the theory of understanding, which is being formed in the early Heidegger, is

primarily the theory of the categories, in which the transition from the investigation of the conditions for understanding the "objectivity of object" to the "theory of understanding being as being" or ontology is carried out. The conceptual apparatus correlated with this theory was analysed and the genesis of the basic concepts was explicated, which go back to the original distinctions carried out in the works of Lask, Husserl and Kant.

In conclusion, connections were also established between the philosophical doctrines of Lask, Husserl and Kant, which are formed in Heidegger's works, since the ideas of these doctrines are explicated in Heidegger within the framework of the development of his being problems. It is noted that Heidegger's later turn to Kant's transcendental investigation – as the theory that explains the conditions for the understanding of being – is associated with the very transcendental-phenomenological beginning of Heidegger's philosophising and the general centralization of his philosophy to the problem of the categories.

Thus, the first chapter explored the connection between the works of the early Heidegger and the *Logic of Philosophy* of the neo-Kantian Lask, since this connection determined the very beginning of Heidegger's philosophy and contributed to the development of the question of being as the question of categories. Moreover, it was demonstrated that it was through Lask's writings that Heidegger returned to his study of phenomenological conception of categorial intuition, which he then implemented into his own philosophical project.

In the second chapter, the phenomenological theory of meaning was explored, which receives its full foundation within the idea of categorial intuition, as well as the related phenomenological concept of truth. The meaningful connection was established between Heidegger's being problems

and the idea of categorial intuition, the correlate of which, according to Heidegger, can only be the "phenomenal givenness of the being". It was also established that, according to Husserl and Heidegger, it is possible to qualify as "true" only the being, which is the correlate of determined by their structure acts of evident perception. Hence, it was concluded that for the thematization of the concept of truth in fundamental ontology, the phenomenological notion of the dynamics of empty and intuitively fulfilled intention of meaning plays a key role.

The subject of the third chapter was Heidegger's "turn to Kant", which was considered as the development of Heidegger's theory of the understanding of being. It has been shown that the concept of categorial intuition is developed here through the idea of "pure reason" as the "finite perceiving intuition". In addition, the change in the very perspective of Heidegger's investigation was also noted, and it was pointed out that these changes could be associated with the closing of the project of fundamental ontology as the project of transcendental philosophy.

Author's publications on the topic of the dissertation

Melnikova E. (2022). The Question Concerning Conceptualisation of Philosophy: Heidegger and Lask. *Voprosy Filosofii*. 2, 158–168. (Scopus Q2, WoS)

Melnikova E. (2022). The Problem of the Categorial in the Phenomenological Analysis of Perception: Husserl and Heidegger. *HORIZON. Studies in Phenomenology*. Vol. 11, №2 , 641-665 (Scopus Q2, WoS)

Melnikova E. (2024). Husserl, Heidegger and Lask: The Doctrine of Sense and Meaning. *Philosophy Journal of the Higher School of Economics*, 8(2), 162-182. (Scopus Q2)